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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on interdiction of Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive 
Devices (VBIED) on a major city by using “transparent” and “deceptive” assets. 
Transparent assets (e.g., road blocks) are those for which we assume positions are known 
by both attackers and interdictors.  “Decoys” and “traps” are deceptive assets.  Decoys 
are meant to be perceived as effective interdiction assets by attackers, while traps are not 
perceived.  We use a mathematical optimization model to allocate interdiction assets 
maximizing expected interdicted “value.”  Then, we use agent-based simulation to assess 
the effectiveness of those interdiction plans against a variety of attacker’s behaviors: 
perceptive (as assumed by the optimization), naïve, communicative, route blocker 
(static), route blocker (dynamic) and clairvoyant.  We use two test networks and seven 
scenarios consisting of different combinations of interdiction assets.  From our analysis 
we note that: (a) if the network incorporates deception, any behavior other than 
perceptive may be advantageous to the attacker; (b) a communicative behavior proves 
effective for the attackers against scenarios containing traps; (c) decoys are most effective 
if used in defense against perceptive-like behaviors; and, (d) if the defender expects 
perceptive-like behavior, then adding transparent assets to traps and decoys may be of 
little value.   
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Regardless of the era, the purposes of military deception have always been 
similar: Military deception is utilized as a means to change the tactical decisions of the 
enemy, whether offensive or defensive. This thesis focuses on deceptive interdiction of 
Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs).  In particular we look at how to 
distribute a pre-specified number of “transparent” and “deceptive” interdiction assets in a 
city in order to maximize the interdiction of VBIEDs.  
Transparent assets (e.g., road blocks) are those for which we assume positions are 
known by both attackers and interdictors.  Deceptive assets are further divided into 
“decoys” and “traps.” Decoys have little or no interdiction effectiveness, and their 
positions are known by both sides.  However, their value lies in that their effectiveness is 
concealed, and actually exaggerated in order to make them seem much more effective 
than they are.  Traps, on the other hand, are effective interdiction tools whose positions 
are unknown to the attackers.   
We build on existing mathematical optimization models to represent the problem 
of allocating interdiction assets maximizing expected interdicted “value,” and develop 
new agent-based simulation models to assess the effectiveness of those interdiction plans 
against a variety of attacker’s behaviors. 
Seven attacker behaviors have been explored: perceptive, naïve, communicative, 
route blocker (static), route blocker (dynamic) and clairvoyant.  The perceptive behavior 
(assumed by the defender’s optimization model) presumes the attacker is oblivious to 
deceptive assets deployed by the defender.  The naïve behavior is solely based on shortest 
distance to the target. All other behaviors are perceptive-like, but incorporate features 
such as learning (communicative), and random detours (route blocker static and 
dynamic).  The clairvoyant behavior assumes full knowledge by the attacker and is used 
solely for bounding purposes. 
Two test networks and seven scenarios per case (each scenario consisting of 
different combinations of interdiction assets) have been studied.  Several conclusions of 
 xvi
general application to any case have been derived, while others are case specific.  From 
our analysis we note the following observations: 
- If the network incorporates deception, any other behavior (than perceptive) 
may be advantageous to the attacker. 
- A communicative behavior proves particularly effective over time for the 
attackers against scenarios containing traps.   
- Decoys are most effective if used in defense against perceptive-like behaviors.  
They are rendered ineffective against attackers which behave naïvely.   
- If the defender expects the attacker to act with any perceptive-like behavior, 
then the addition of transparent assets to traps and decoys may be of little 
value.   
In addition, this work has developed a graphical user interface which integrates 
the optimization and simulation models.  This interface aids with problem data 
preparation and validation, transfers appropriate data and results between models, and 
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Deception tactics have historical references ranging from the mythical Trojan 
horse to Operation Fortitude during World War II, and tactics applied more recently 
during Operation Desert Storm [Spiller, 1992].  Regardless of the era, the purposes of 
military deception have always been similar: Military deception is utilized as a means to 
change the tactical decisions of the enemy whether offensive or defensive.  The enemy 
could offensively plan to attack a false target (or target of little value) due to deception by 
the friendly force.  As a defensive example, the enemy might switch the majority of their 
forces to the wrong border due to believing an attack will come from a different location.  
Sometimes deception can be used to simply give a perception of ignorance, so that the 
original plans are executed while the enemy is oblivious of the fact that their target is 
aware of their intentions and has adequately defended itself.  Regardless of the intentions 
of the deception and the resulting effects, military deception is commonly characterized 
as an art. 
A.  CONCEPT DEVELOPMENT: OVERVIEW 
One of the major responsibilities of a government is to safeguard the safety of its 
citizens.  Threatening that safety is one of the terrorists’ ideal tactics to undermine  
governments and disrupt society at large.  Major cities tend to be the battlefield where 
these opposing objectives meet, offering the highest level of impact for terrorists and 
great difficulty for governments to protect, at least without disrupting the regular lives of 
their citizens. 
There are many methods that terrorists have used in history, and there are 
probably more to be seen.  Currently, a common method used by terrorists and insurgents 
is Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) [Dudonis, 2005].  Whether IEDs are emplaced, 
human carried (i.e., suicide bombers), or vehicle borne, they are all effective at 
challenging civilian safety.  Among these three categories, Vehicle Borne Improvised 
Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) typically claim most lives per occurrence due to the 
payload capacity of vehicles, ranging from small cars to large trucks. 
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This thesis focuses on interdiction of VBIEDs in a major city.  In particular we 
look at how to distribute a pre-specified number of “transparent” and “deceptive” 
interdiction assets in the city in order to maximize a Detection Value Function (DVF).  
The DVF comprises the probability of interrupting a VBIED before it reaches its target 
and the value of the target itself, across a number of VBIED origins and destinations.   
(Remark: In what follows we shall refer to VBIEDs and the terrorists who carry them 
interchangeably as VBIEDs, terrorists or attackers.)  
Major cities are target-rich environments for VBIED attacks. Their large 
populations and meshed structure of highways and roads create ideal distribution 
networks for such attacks.  On cities with higher probability of VBIED incidents, 
proactive measures are normally taken in order to intercept them.  These measures are 
usually in the form of roadblocks, in which peace officers or military personnel inspect 
some or all of the vehicles passing through the roadblock.  The personnel conducting the 
inspection use a spectrum of tools [Dudonis, 2005] including visual, and canine and 
sensor (x-ray, infrared, or electromagnetic) inspections, among others. 
We use the concept of deception in determining where to place two categories of 
assets: “transparent” and “deceptive,” of which the latter can be further divided into 
“decoys” and “traps.”  Transparent assets (e.g., road blocks) are those for which we 
assume positions are known by both attackers and interdictors, and their effectiveness can 
be assumed as being equally known.  Decoys have little or no interdiction effectiveness, 
and their positions are known by both sides.  However, their value lies in that their 
effectiveness is concealed, and actually exaggerated so as to make them seem much more 
effective than they are.  Traps, on the other hand, are effective interdiction tools whose 
positions are unknown to the attackers. 
B.  THE PROBLEM IN THE CONTEXT OF NETWORK INTERDICTION 
MODELS 
A city road grid can be represented mathematically as network of nodes and arcs.  
This representation allows for the use of “standard” network analyses such as single- and 
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multi-commodity network flow models (see, e.g., Ahuja et al. [1993]).  These standard 
network problems aim to maximize network efficiency, minimize costs, and the like.   
Network interdiction models (see, e.g., Wood [2003]) augment standard network 
theory by establishing bi-level and tri-level Stackelberg games with two players: an 
attacker and a defender (where the latter, in fact, usually plays a double role as defender 
and network operator).  Assuming transparency in the information shared by these 
players, the tri-level “defender-attacker-defender” model, for example, posits a defender 
using limited (defensive) resources with which to protect select components in his system 
(in this context, represented as a network).  His goal is to minimize the potential damage 
a worst-case attack on the system might cause.  Then, an attacker with limited (offensive) 
resources solves a problem to determine which components should be disabled in order to 
inflict maximum damage.  Finally, the defender (now acting as the network operator) 
operates the residual (non-interdicted) network to minimize disruption.   
Brown et al., [2005, 2006] show a wide variety of applications of network 
interdiction theory, especially in the areas of interdiction and defense of critical 
infrastructure.  In the bi-level “attacker-defender” (or “defender-attacker”) and tri-level 
“defender-attacker-defender” models, transparency translates into a unique objective 
function, shared by both players, with diametrically opposed goals (minimize versus 
maximize, or vice versa).  The most important advantage of employing the transparency 
approach is that no player can improve his strategy without compromising the outcome: 
(a) if the defender chooses an alternative defensive plan, an intelligent attacker could 
obtain a larger disruption, provided he acts optimally; and, (b) there is no other course of 
action for the adversary (than the one dictated by his damage-maximization problem) 
which can yield a larger disruption in the system. 
There are certain interdiction problems, however, in which the defender could 
take advantage of non-transparent interdiction assets.  This thesis tests an “interdiction 
with deception” (IWD) model, currently under development by faculty at the Naval 
Postgraduate School, which may ultimately help in the allocation of limited transparent 
and deceptive assets to interdict VBIEDs.   
 4
The IWD model seeks an optimal placement of available interdiction assets in 
order to maximize the probability of detection of an attacker infiltrating a network with 
one or multiple potential targets.  The model is extended to multiple attackers, with 
different values for each attacker, leading to a DVF which approximates expected 
interdicted value.   
The IWD model relies on two key assumptions: (a) the defender knows exactly 
how the attacker will perceive transparent and deceptive interdictions on arcs, as well as 
arcs which have not been interdicted; and, (b) the attackers will use these perceptions 
(specifically, the perceived probabilities of being interdicted on each network arc) to 
determine optimal routes to their targets.   
The use of non-transparent assets provides a field commander with a force 
multiplier to augment the efficiency of interdiction based on transparent assets only (such 
as that of road blocks).  However, as opposed to the fully transparent case, the IWD 
model cannot guarantee that, if the attacker does not behave as expected, he will not find 
a better route than anticipated by the model.  This begs the question: “What would 
happen if the plan is made according to a ‘perceptive’ behavior but the attacker behaves 
differently?”  For this reason this thesis devises and implements an agent-based 
simulation (ABS) model to test the IWD solution against other possible attacker’s 
behaviors, namely “naive,” “road-blocker (static and dynamic),” “communicative” and 
“clairvoyant,” which will be described in detail later in this document.  
This research evaluates the IWD and ABS models on two test cases: a small 
network, as a proof of concept from which we may gain insights into the effects of 
adding deceptive interdiction assets; and, a large network, derived from a notional city, 
Dystopia [Locke, 2008] to evaluate the complexity of realistically-sized problems.  We 
test the outcomes for all of the behaviors using several defender-resource scenarios per 
case. 
We caution the reader that it is not the goal of this research to predict VBIED 
attacks, but to explore the potential effectiveness of interdiction tactics which include 
deception under several insurgent behavior assumptions.  This requires merging new, 
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non-transparent network interdiction models with agent-based simulation, two distinct 
methods of analysis that seldom are combined.  In essence, we are facing a stochastic 
problem (given the unknown behavior of the attacker, among others).  As an example of 
previous work which combines optimization and simulation, Sanchez and Wood [2006] 
build an algorithm to solve two-stage stochastic problems by optimization and 
simulation. They first generate multiple candidate solutions for the first-stage problem (in 
our case, these decisions would correspond to the placement of interdiction assets).  
Then, multiple second-stage outcomes are simulated (terrorist behaviors), which are 
formally tested to ensure the candidate solutions contain an optimal one with certain 
probability.  While this work has not pursued Sanchez and Wood’s algorithmic approach, 
we recognize the underlying motivation is similar, and that their methodology would be 
useful to analyze the problem under consideration. 
 Although city protection against VBIEDs is the focus area of this research, the 
application of the theory, methods and software developed in this thesis is much broader.  
For example, similar deception techniques can be adapted for other than road networks, 
such as communication and data, with applications to intruder detection.  Also, civilian 
authorities involved in Homeland Defense can take advantage of similar analysis in 
problems such as vehicle high speed deterrence and trapping, drug interdiction and 
border patrol.   
C.  THESIS OUTLINE 
The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II presents the 
modeling approach, that is, the problem statement and the optimization and simulation 
models.  Chapter III introduces the two test scenarios and associated computational 
experience.  Chapter IV illustrates the supporting tools (database and graphical user 
interface) that have been developed to facilitate the analysis.  Finally, Chapter V 
discusses our conclusions and recommends future work. 
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II. MODELING APPROACH 
This chapter discusses the modeling approach for the problem of allocating 
limited interdiction assets (transparent and deceptive) in a city in order to maximize a 
DVF which captures the probability of interdicting attacks against pre-specified targets 
and the value of those targets.  Before we discuss the mathematical approach 
(optimization and simulation models), we state the problem in terms of its components 
and data elements. 
A. PROBLEM STATEMENT AND DATA ELEMENTS 
The goal of the problem is to obtain a plan which details where in a city to place a 
limited number of interdiction assets whose combined effectiveness to protect pre-
determined locations inside the city is maximized.   
The city’s roads are modeled as a network; therefore we define the network data 
elements in terms of nodes and arcs.  The data elements related to the nodes are listed in 
Table 1. 
 
Attribute Data Type Description 
Node Text Name for the Node 
Location X Real Number X-location for the Node 
Location Y Real Number Y-location for the Node 
Table 1.   Node Elements 
 
A node is uniquely identified by its name and has X-Y Cartesian location 
attributes.  These are necessary for arc-length calculations. 
Arcs are defined by their “head” and “tail” nodes, representing the starting and 




Attribute Data Type Description 
Tail Text Starting node 
Head Text Ending node 
Type of Arc Text Links to Arc type attributes 
Interdictable Yes / No Is the Arc interdictable? 
Nominal Interdiction 
Probability 
Proportion Calculated based on arc length and speed 
Transparent Interdiction 
Probability 
Proportion Transparent (i.e., road blocks) 
Trap Interdiction Probability Proportion Traps (Invisible to attackers) 
Decoy Perceived Probability Proportion Decoy (Perceived by attackers, higher than actual)) 
Table 2.   Arc Elements 
 
Besides the tail and head elements, the arc data structure contains fields for the 
nominal, transparent and trap interdiction probabilities, and the decoy perceived 
probability.  All of these are pre-specified by the user or pre-calculated according to 
certain assumptions, as explained below.  Some arcs can be deemed non-interdictable, 
thus the need for the Interdictable Boolean attribute. 
Each type of arc has its own attributes (see Table 3).  The Nominal Interdiction 
Probability is that of interrupting the VBIED while traversing an arc even if the arc is not 
interdicted.  This may occur, for example, if the vehicle has a breakdown and/or is 
recognized by routine police patrols.  This value is typically very low, but it is a 
necessary element in our approach.  The nominal interdiction probability is determined 
by the NominalMultiplier (measured in s-1 to reflect the fact that, the longer the vehicle 
stays on the road, the more likely it is to be detected), the AvgSpeed, which is the average 
vehicle speed on the road, and the ArcLength, which is calculated using the X-Y 
coordinates of the Tail and Head nodes. The Nominal Interdiction Probability is then 
calculated according to the following formula: 




For example, if a 100-meter road is given a NominalMultiplier value of 0.0006 s-1 and an 
AvgSpeed value of 20 m/s (72 km/h) then the Nominal Interdiction Probability assigned 
to this arc is 0.3%. 
 
Attribute Data Type Description 
Type of Arc Text For example (City, Highway, Rural) 
Avg Speed Real Number Average Speed of traversal 
Nominal 
Multiplier 
Real Number Multiplier for Nominal Interdiction 
Probability Calculation 
Table 3.   Arc Types Table Elements 
 
Currently, the model explores three interdiction methods, different from nominal 













GenericDecoy Decoy 0.25 5 0 
GenericTrap Trap 0.75 0 0 
RoadBlock Transparent 0.25 0 0 
Table 4.   Values Stored in the Current Methods Table  
 
Moreover, by modifying the Method Name and Method Type fields we can add 
more methods of each type with different effectiveness values.  Table 4 shows the values 
assigned to the different methods explored in this research to calculate the (other than 
nominal) interdiction probabilities.  The distance and speed correction factors are 
combined with the nominal probability of detection and the average speed associated 
with the arc in order to enhance or degrade the interdiction probability of the method.  
Speed, for example, could degrade the interdiction probability of a trap, if such a trap 
requires a certain time engaged and has a limited range of effectiveness.  Similarly, arc 
length could potentially improve the effectiveness of a decoy, if such a decoy can be 
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perceived throughout the arc.  Conversely, to reflect degradation, we can use negative 








Baseline Probability of  Interdiction
Nominal Probability Detection Distance Correction Factor




Next, we define the attacker’s data elements (Table 5).  Each attacker is given a 
name, value, and target and start nodes, all of which are user-defined inputs.  The model 
assumes that the starting positions for the attackers are known but, if this is not the case, 
we may accommodate an unknown origin by adding artificial, non-interdictable arcs from 
a fictitious starting node to all the potential starting nodes for the attacker. 
The attacker’s value is assumed to be the same for both the attacker and the 
defender.  For example, it may be based on the amount of explosives carried by that 
attacker [BATF, 2005], therefore reflecting, to some extent, the number of people that 
would be killed by that VBIED. Our computational experiment assumes each attacker has 
a unique target; however, the optimization model presented in the next section allows for 
a multiple-target attacker who, based on the network configuration after interdiction, 
decides on his best target. Similarly, it is possible that multiple attackers start at the same 
origin with different destinations.  
 
Attribute Data Type Description 
Agent Text Agent's identifier 
Value Number Target value 
Target Node Text Target Node name 
Start Node Text Start Node name 
Table 5.   Agent Data Elements 
 
Finally, the problem data is completed by specifying the number of interdiction 
assets of each type available to the defender.  These parameters (number of transparent, 
traps and decoys) are globally referred to as “interdiction resources.”   
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B. OPTIMIZATION MODEL 
In this section we describe the IWD model for the problem stated in Section A.  
The full derivation and details of the model can be found in [Salmeron, 2007].  This 
section summarizes the mathematical formulation and its parameters. 
 The notation for the optimization model is as follows: 
 
 Sets and indices 
I, set of nodes in the network, for ,i j I∈  
A I I⊂ × , set of arcs in the network, for ( , )i j A∈  
N, set of potential attackers trying to cross through the network, for n N∈  
ns I∈ , source node for attacker n.   
nT I⊂ , subset of possible target nodes for attacker n.  We assume n ns T∉  
 
Parameters 
nv , value of attacker n (e.g., based on the amount of explosive he carries) 
nijp , nominal probability of interdicting attacker n traversing (non-interdicted) 
arc (i,j). Note:  1nij nijq p= −  
nijp% , probability of interdicting attacker n traversing arc (i,j) with transparent 
interdiction asset.  Note: 1nij nijq p= −% %  
nijp , non-transparent probability of interdicting attacker n traversing arc (i,j) 
with trap interdiction asset.  (Attackers perceive nominal.) Note: 
1nij nijq p= −  
nijp , non-transparent probability of interdiction perceived by attacker n while 
traversing “decoy” arc (i,j).  (Actual is nominal.)  Note: 1nij nijq p= −  
R% , amount of transparent interdiction resource 
R , amount of trap interdiction resource 
R , amount of decoy interdiction resource 
ija% , amount of transparent interdiction resource needed to interdict arc (i,j) 
ija , amount of trap interdiction resource needed to interdict arc (i,j)  
ija , amount of decoy interdiction resource needed to interdict arc (i,j) 
 
Decision variables 
nijx , 1 if attacker n uses arc (i,j); 0 otherwise.  The vector of all nijx  is denoted 
as x, and the vector of all nijx  for a particular attacker n is denoted as nx . 
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nid , 1 if attacker n targets node ni T∈ .  The vector of all nid  is denoted as d, 
and the vector of all nid  for a particular attacker n is denoted as nd . 
ijy% , 1 if arc (i,j) is interdicted with a transparent asset; 0 otherwise. 
ijy , 1 if arc (i,j) is interdicted with a trap: agents perceive the arc has not been 
interdicted. 
ijy , 1 if arc (i,j) is interdicted with a decoy: agents perceive the arc has been 
interdicted. 
 



























−= = −  
lognij nijc q= − ; lognij nijc r= −% % ; lognij nijc q= − ; and, lognij nijc q= −  
t, artificial “super-sink” node 
* { }I I t= ∪  (set of nodes augmented with the super-sink node) 
* {( , ) | }n nA A i t i T= ∪ ∈  (set of arcs augmented with arcs from destination nodes 
for attacker n to the super-sink node). 
 
Formulation 
The defender tries to maximize a DVF representing expected value intercepted, 
which is given by: 
( , )
max 1 nij nij nij nij nijx x y x yn nij nij nij
n N i j A
v q r r
∈ ∈






      (1)   
Note (1) incorporates the actual interdiction probabilities, but xn solves the flow problem 
for the n-th attacker, who perceives a different set of interdiction probabilities and 
therefore attempts to minimize the following objective: 
( , )






      (2)   
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|( , ) |( , )
| |
1, if ( )
1, if ( ) , ,






j i j A j j i A
ni
i s u










     (3)   
Remark: The u-variables refer to dual variables for the corresponding constraints.  
Some manipulations to the above formulation are necessary in order to convert 
this bi-level problem with two different non-linear objectives into a mixed-integer 
problem. In order to do that, we note that: 
a) We may convert the products in objective (2) into a linear objective by 
applying the logarithm function.  This is true because *nx  solving (2) also solves: 
( )
( , ) ( , )
min log minnij nij nij nij nijx x y x ynij nij nij nij nij ij nij ij nij
i j A i j A
q r r c c y c y x
∈ ∈




b) If |N|=1, i.e., for the single-attacker (with a unique or multiple destinations), we 
may also eliminate the product in objective (1) by applying the logarithm function.  This 
is true because the summation contains a single term, n = 1, and an optimal specification 
of all the y-variables will also solve: 
( )
( , ) ( , )
max log maxnij nij nij nij nijx x y x ynij nij nij nij nij ij nij ij nijYi j A i j A
q r r c c y c y x
∈∈ ∈





.   
 In this case, we may solve the linear version of (1) (after taking logarithms) and 
then substitute back into (1) to obtain the actual expected value function sought. 
c) However, if multiple attackers exist, |N| >1, the logarithm function cannot be 
used directly in (1).  Our assumption in this case is that (1) will still be strongly correlated 
to the following objective: 
 
 
  ( )
( , ) ( , )
max log max .nij nij nij nij nijx x y x yn nij nij nij n nij nij ij nij ij nijYn N i j A n N i j A
v q r r v c c y c y x
∈∈ ∈ ∈ ∈






However, in this case we cannot claim that solutions resulting from solving this 
variant will yield optimal solutions to the original objective of maximizing expected 
value interdicted.  
d) Since (1) and (2) represent different objective functions, the well-known 
technique of dualization of the inner problem to obtain a max-max formulation (see e.g., 
Brown et al. [2006]) is not applicable.  However, since x in (1) is defined implicitly 
through the constrained optimization subproblems in (2)-(3), we may use strong duality 
theory to replace (2) (actually, (2) as modified after taking logarithms, see remark (a)).  
The replacement is sets the objective of problem (2)-(3) equal to that of its dual 
counterpart, similarly to the technique used by Motto et al. [2005].  (Of course, we need 
to add additional dual constraints too.) 
e) In each of the |N| subproblems in (2)-(3), binary constraints can be converted 
into continuous ones due to unimodularity of the shortest-path problem, 
*0, , ( , )nij nx n N i j A≥ ∀ ∈ ∈ .  This, of course, assumes remark (a) above, where we have 
used the logarithm function to convert (2) into a linear-equivalent objective. 




max n nij nij ij nij ij nij
Y, , U n N i j A
v c c y c y x
∈ ∈ℵ ∈ ∈ ∈
⎛ ⎞+ +⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑ ∑ % %y x u     (4) 
subject to: ( ) ,
( , )
,
nnij nij ij nij ij nij n s nt
i j A
c c y c y x u u n N
∈





|( , ) |( , )
*
1, if 
1, if , ,
0, otherwise




j i j A j j i A
nij n
i s
x x i t i I n N
x n N i j A
∈ ∈
=⎧ ⎧⎪⎪ − = − = ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈⎨⎪∈ℵ ≡ ⎨ ⎪⎩⎪⎪ ≥ ∀ ∈ ∈⎩










1, ( , )











Y a y R
y y y i j A











y      (7) 
, , ( , )
0 , , .
ni nj nij nij ij nij ij
ni nt n
u u c c y c y n N i j A
U
u u n N i T
⎧ − ≤ + + ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈⎪∈ ≡ ⎨ − ≤ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈⎪⎩
% %
u   (8) 
 
While all constraints *Y, , U∈ ∈ℵ ∈y x u  are linear (disregarding integrality conditions 
on the y-variables), the objective function (4) and constraint (5) are clearly non-linear, 
since they involves cross-products of binary and continuous variables.  A linearization of 
these cross products can be achieved, e.g., by replacing every yx%  product by x% , every yx  




max n nij nij nij nij nij ijY, , U n N i j A
v c x c x c x
∈ ∈ℵ ∈ ∈ ∈
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≤ ≤ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈
≤ ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈
≥ + − ∀ ∈ ∀ ∈
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Thus, the IWD formulation can be finally stated as: 
 
max (9), subject to:
 
(6), (7), (8), (10) and (11). 
 
The IWD is implemented in Xpress-MP (release 2007) [Dash 2007].   
C. SIMULATION 
The IWD model maximizes a DVF assuming attackers perceive interdiction 
probabilities throughout the network in the way we expect they do, and then use them in 
order to optimally plan their routes to the targets.  This is the premise for using decoys 
and traps, which disguise their actual interdiction values with perceived interdiction 
values.  However, these assumptions need not to be the actual behavior for the attackers.  
Since that behavior is unknown, simulations are needed to explore how other behaviors 
will affect the overall effectiveness of the interdiction plan given by the optimization 
step. 
1. Behaviors 
We label the behavior assumed by the IWD model as a perceptive personality. 
Nominal interdiction probabilities and those of road blocks continue to be transparent for 
this, and all, attacker behaviors.  Five other behaviors are explored: naïve, 
communicative, route blocker (static), route blocker (dynamic), and clairvoyant.  
The naïve behavior assumes that the attackers have no knowledge of the 
network’s effectiveness other than the nominal probability of interdiction on each of the 
arcs, which is essentially correlated to length.  In other words, the attackers will try their 
shortest routes even if, for example, this requires that they traverse through visible road 
blocks indiscriminately.  The simulation calculates the shortest route using Dijkstra’s 
algorithm [Ahuja, 1993].  However, since the allocation of interdiction assets has been 
based on a perceptive behavior, these routes might occasionally be beneficial for the 
attackers. 
The communicative behavior emulates the fact that the network’s deceptive layout 
will degrade with time, as attackers traverse it and expose the decoys and traps.  A time 
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horizon is provided as an additional parameter for the simulation.  Throughout the time 
horizon, as the attackers traverse the network and get caught at an arc which is not a road 
block, the attackers will assume a trap and broadcast the value to next period attackers.  
Similarly, when an attacker reaches his target, he will broadcast that decoys traversed in 
his path are possible decoys and decrease their perceived effectiveness value to the  
nominal value. 
The route blocker (static) behavior attempts to add an element of uncertainty to 
the path elected by the attackers.  After an attacker calculates his path, based on the 
perceptive behavior, one arc is randomly selected and discouraged from being used by 
increasing its perceived probability of interdiction to 99.9%.  With the modification 
essentially “blocking” the arc, a new shortest path is calculated and assigned to the 
attacker.  This degrades the effect of the perceptive formulation and adds customization 
to the agent’s decision making process.  This behavior emulates a pre-execution change 
done by the attackers.  If an attacker has information about an arc which he deems as a 
possible delay or interdiction, then a new plan is laid which would not include that arc, 
unless it is the only means to reach the target.  Such information could be a traffic report, 
a weather report, an increase in police activity, a demonstration, or any another event 
which renders the area untraversable. 
The route blocker (dynamic) behavior is similar to its (static) counterpart.  It adds 
an element of uncertainty, but this time the path changes occur during path traversal.  
Prior to a simulation run an arc in the path is selected at random.  The attacker traverses 
the network based on the original path calculated with the perceptive behavior until it 
reaches the randomly selected path.  When the arc is reached, we block it, and a new 
shortest path is calculated from the current position to the target.  This adds a sub-optimal 
element of change to the attacker’s route.  It emulates what an unforeseen change during 
travel will do to an attacker’s percentage of success in reaching his target. 
The clairvoyant behavior computes the minimum interdiction probability path 
based on the actual interdiction values for all of the arcs.  This would be the case when 
the defender’s plan is compromised, or if the attackers had methods of detecting the 
deception assets.  This behavior is not expected, but it provides a worst-case value (for 
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the defender) utilizing deception tactics.  That is, it can be used as a lower bound on the 
actual DVF that could be achieved by the attackers.  













Naïve X - - - - -
Perceptive X X X X - -
Communicative X X X X Learned Learned
Route Blocker (Static) X X X X - -
Route Blocker (Dynamic) X X X X - -
Clairvoyant X X - - X X
Behavior
Interdiction Values Seen by Agents
 
Table 6.   Simulation Behaviors and Characteristics 
 
2. Simulation Flow Charts 
The aforementioned behaviors have been implemented in a customized ABS 
named the Agent Network Attack (ANA) simulation.  ANA has been written in Java 
[Savitch 2005].  ANA uses the solution from the optimization model (described in 
Section B) and then simulates each attacker traversing the network arc-by-arc.   
For all behaviors, except communicative, the overall probability of interdiction is 
calculated for each attacker and his generated route.  The communicative behavior is 
different in that, in order to emulate communication, it has to stochastically determine the 
specific arc in which an attacker has been interdicted, if any.  The result of these 
individual events determines what information is made available to all the attackers in 
subsequent periods. 
Tallies are kept for each simulation run and for each attacker in every behavior.  
After all the iterations are complete for each simulated behavior a report is generated. 
The following flow diagrams help explain the ANA simulation algorithms:  
Figure 1 shows the flow diagram for the perceptive behavior.  Figure 2 is for the naïve 
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behavior.  Figure 3 illustrates the, more complex, communicative behavior.  Figures 4 and 
5 are the diagrams for the Route Blocker behaviors, in their Static and Dynamic version, 
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III. COMPUTATIONAL RESULTS 
This Chapter summarizes our computational experience with the IWD and the 
ANA simulation models.  First, we describe relationships amongst different levels of 
interdiction resources that should apply to all test cases.  Then, we illustrate the two cases 
we have studied, one for a small network and the other for a large network.  We present 
the results produced by the optimization and simulation models.     
A. SCENARIOS DESIGN AND RELATIONSHIPS 
Our construct for the two cases studied consists of seven scenarios with different 
combinations of interdiction resources.  In our computational experience, we have tried 
seven scenarios of interdiction resource for each test case, as presented in Table 7, where 
an “X” symbol indicates that the scenario uses the corresponding asset.  Although we 
include the undefended (no interdiction) scenario for comparison purposes, we omit the 
scenario that contains only decoys, because in such scenario all the arcs would still be 
undefended.  The available amount of that resource is maintained constant within the 










V X X X
VI X
VII X X  
Table 7.   General Scenario Scheme 
Based on our modeling considerations and the simulated behaviors, a number of 
relationships and outcomes amongst behaviors and scenarios are derived.  These are all 
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interpreted with respect to the attacker’s point of view, and exclude the clairvoyant 
behavior which, for obvious reasons, is the preferred behavior regardless the scenario.  
Table 6 in Chapter II summarizes the behavior characteristics for the attackers. 
1) For Scenarios I and II, the perceptive behavior is the best behavior to 
adopt by the attackers because the cases are fully transparent.  Any other 
course of action entails the exposure to worse nominal or transparent 
interdiction arcs, thus increasing the probability of interdiction. 
2) For Scenarios I and VI, the naïve behavior’s value is equal to the 
perceptive behavior’s value. In Scenario I, this is due to the absence of 
interdictions. In Scenario VI, it is due to the traps having no perceptive 
value other than nominal. 
3) In Scenario VII, the attacker benefits from using the naïve behavior 
instead of any other behavior. This is because the decoys are ignored by 
the attackers and therefore the trap placement solution, which depends on 
the decoy’s deterrence quality, is always degraded. 
4) In Scenario III, the naïve behavior is better than the perceptive behavior.  
This outcome is due to the decoys being ignored, thus negating their 
deterrence quality and not being effective in guiding the attackers towards 
the transparent interdictions. 
5) For Scenarios IV through VII, the communicative behavior favors the 
attackers when compared against the perceptive behavior.  Any scenario 
that contains traps becomes less effective when these traps are exposed, 
which is what the communicative behavior does. 
6) For Scenarios I through VII, the Route Blocker Static behavior is better for 
the attackers than the Route Blocker Dynamic behavior. This is because 
the former plans the route prior to traversing, while the latter does not 
change its route until it encounters a blocked arc.  
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7) Finally, for any two scenarios, if the second scenario has at least the same 
number of assets of all types as the first scenario, the perceptive behavior 
should be no worse for the attacker in the second scenario than in the first.  
This is because the IWD problem in the second scenario is a relaxation of 
that in the first one. 
B. BASIC PROBLEM 
1. Description 
The Basic-Problem case contains 20 nodes and 90 arcs, as seen in Figure 7.  
Three attackers are defined, namely “A1”, “A2” and “A3,” all of them starting at node 8 
(highlighted in red).  There are three targets (nodes 3, 12 and 20), one for each attacker.   
 
 
Figure 7.   Basic-Problem Network Scenario I 
The small scale of the Basic problem scenario has allowed us to solve the IWD 
problems optimally, as well as performing a large number of ANA simulation 
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replications.  While this scenario is very small, applications can be found if a realistic 
network could be divided into smaller sub-networks, each one operating near-
autonomously, or coordinated by a larger “master model.”  Also, each of the above nodes 
could represent a larger suburb (or region), in which case the concept of interdiction on 
arcs needs to represent aggregated information regarding transfers between those 
suburbs.   
The following table, Table 8, summarizes how the attackers are defined and also 
the values of their targets.  The total target value is 60, which results from the sum of the 
individual attackers’ values (10, 20 and 30, respectively).  This means that, if we could 
guarantee 100% protection of all the targets, the achieved DFV would be precisely 60. 
 
 
Name Value targetName SNodeName: 
A1 10 3 8 
A2 20 12 8 
A3 30 20 8 
Table 8.   Basic Problem Attacker Table 
2. Results 
In the absence of interdiction assets (Scenario I) the optimal routes for the agents 
are through nodes 8, 4, 5, 2, 3 (for “A1”), through nodes 8, 9, 10, 11 12 (for “A2”), and 
through nodes 8, 14, 15, 16, 20 (for “A3”).  The DVF for this scenario is 0.48, where the 
low value is explained by the low nominal interdiction probabilities on all arcs.  
Table 9 summarizes the results for this test case.  For each behavior and scenario 
we show estimations of total expected interdicted value, Vˆ , and standard deviation,σˆ .  
Assuming ˆnp  represents the point estimation for the probability of interdicting attacker n 
under a particular attacker’s behavior, and N is the sample size, Vˆ  and σˆ  are calculated 
as follows: 
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1 1 2 2 3 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆA A A A A AV v p v p v p= + +         (12) 
2 2 21 1 2 2 3 3
1 2 3
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1 ) (1 ) (1 )ˆ A A A A A AA A A
p p p p p pv v v
N N N
σ − − −= + + .   (13) 
Note that nV  is calculated exactly ( 0σ = ) for the perceptive, naïve and 
clairvoyant behaviors because, given any defender’s plan, we can calculate np  exactly 
without resorting to sampling.   
For the other behaviors, the Basic Problem uses 5,000N = , except for the 
communicative behavior which employs 15,000N =  samples (due to the problem’s 
horizon of three periods).   
 
Table 9.   Result Summary for Basic Problem 
 
As expected, results are consistent with all of theoretical relationships listed in 
Section A.  We find some case-specific outcomes, as explained in the following 
paragraphs.  
For Scenario II, the naïve behavior is the worst for attackers.  This scenario is 
fully transparent.  Therefore, all other behaviors which use some perception are closer to 
the perceptive behavior, which as the theory of interdiction states is the optimal for fully 
transparent scenarios.  Figure 8 helps illustrate how the interdictions are placed and the 
paths that would be selected by a naïve and perceptive behavior. (Note: The column 
labeled “agent” refers to “attacker” in this and subsequent figures). 
Clairvoyant
I 0 0 0.48 0.48 0.48 0.27 0.49 0.11 0.55 0.12 0.48
II 5 0 7.88 10.33 7.95 1.89 8.30 0.21 7.95 0.21 7.88
III 5 0 7 20.94 10.33 20.75 2.33 20.97 0.26 22.40 0.26 0.57
IV 5 3 58.60 20.86 21.79 2.33 30.86 0.26 59.08 0.12 0.64
V 5 3 7 59.22 41.34 33.79 2.37 42.56 0.25 59.58 0.11 0.51
VI 0 3 29.77 29.77 12.61 1.99 25.45 0.24 29.91 0.12 0.49
VII 0 3 7 59.07 10.25 33.42 2.38 39.55 0.26 59.58 0.10 0.49
Blue's Best 12.61 20.97 22.40
Red's Best 33.79 42.56 59.58434















Figure 8.   Basic Problem, Scenario II, Naïve and Perceptive Behaviors 
  
Scenario III is the weakest of the deceptive scenarios in terms of perceptive 
behavior for the defenders.  However, since it does not contain traps, the communicative 
behavior gives nearly null advantage to the attackers.  Figure 9 shows how the naïve 




Figure 9.   Basic Problem, Scenario III, Naïve and Perceptive Behaviors 
 
In Scenario IV (Figure 10) we notice how the traps can be exploited very 
effectively by the defenders, which in turn makes the communicative behavior more 




Figure 10.   Basic Problem, Scenario IV, Naïve and Perceptive Behaviors 
 
As expected, given that it contains more resources, Scenario V (shown in Figure 11) is 
the best scenario for the defenders, regardless of the simulated behavior.  (Note: Also 




Figure 11.   Basic Problem, Scenario V, Naïve and Perceptive Behaviors 
 
Figure 12 illustrates Scenario VI.  We observe that all of the traps are placed on 
arcs corresponding to attacker “A3,” achieving a DVF of 30 (almost 50%).  This solution 
is clearly suboptimal because one trap could have been placed on each attacker’s path, 
which would have yielded a DVF of at least 45 (75%).  This is a consequence of the 
objective function used by the IWD, which correlates but does not fully represent the 
concept of expected value in the case of multiple attackers.  In general, the 
communicative behavior helps the attackers the most amongst all the scenarios that 
contain traps.  This is even more emphasized when the IWD solution is suboptimal as 




highest-value target is maximized, affecting attacker “A3” only; as soon as they are 
exposed by the communicative behavior, new routes direct the attacker away from arcs 




Figure 12.   Basic Problem, Scenario VI, Naïve and Perceptive Behaviors 
 
Scenario VII demonstrates how a naïve behavior may defeat the perceptive behavior 
assumed to place the interdiction assets.  All attackers would be deceived by decoys to 
take routes that contain traps, if they acted with a perceptive behavior.  However, the 






Figure 13.   Basic Problem, Scenario VII, Naïve and Perceptive Behaviors 
 
All the above experiments have used three periods for the communicative 
behavior. Since the number of communication periods affects the DVF in this behavior, 
we have performed some experiments with five and seven communication periods.  Table 
10 and Figure 14 show the results for this experiment, where the impact of longer 
communication periods is realized in those scenarios involving traps (Scenarios IV 




I 0 0 0 0.5 0.48 0.49 0.49
II 5 0 0 7.9 7.95 7.87 7.86
III 5 0 7 20.9 20.75 20.73 20.88
IV 5 3 0 58.6 21.79 13.38 9.82
V 5 3 7 59.2 33.79 24.85 20.72
VI 0 3 0 29.8 12.61 8.07 5.93
VII 0 3 7 59.1 33.42 20.41 14.78
Communicative Simulation ResultsScenario Description
























Figure 14.   Communicative Behavior Results for Different Periods per Scenario 
 
In a scenario where no deception is utilized (Scenarios I and II), the 
communicative behavior hinders the attackers.  This is due to the effect of nominal 
interdictions: If a nominal interdiction occurs, then an agent is forced to believe that a 
trap exists in that arc and therefore alter its path and increase its risk of interdiction by 
transiting more (or less attractive) nominal arcs.  A similar situation occurs for Scenario 
III where only decoys are deceptive.  Here, since decoys are seldom traversed (because of 
their nature as decoys), attackers also tend to traverse nominal arcs or transparent 
interdictions only, as in Scenarios I and II. 
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This kind of experiment can help planners in determining how frequent to change 




Dystopia (Figure 15 [Locke, 2007]) is a notional region that consists of two cities, 
Grim City and Cape Hazard.  Dystopia was developed as part of a homeland security 
initiative which required a city to serve as a test case while keeping any results of an 
investigation at the unclassified level.  Figure 16 shows Dystopia’s road network.  Cape 
Hazard’s road system has been chosen as our case study.  Figure 17 shows a closer view 
of Cape Hazard’s road network. 
Figure 15.   Dystopia 
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Figure 16.    Dystopia in Shape File Format 
 
Figure 17.   Cape Hazard in Shape File Format 
 
The data for Dystopia comes in the form of shape files.  A technical issue arises 
when dealing with shape files.  Shape files are designed for compact and common 
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geographical data exchange; however, as is, the data contained in the file does not lend 
itself for network analysis: it requires conversion into an appropriate node and arc 
construct with which to build the network structure used by our optimization and 
simulation models.  To overcome this difficulty, we have developed a tool which 
performs this non-trivial task.  Details are included in Chapter IV.   
By using the converting tool, we transform Dystopia into a network consisting of 
4,922 nodes and 6,927 arcs (see Figure 18).  Unfortunately, the conversion has some side 
effects.  For example, many of these arcs will correspond to the same road segment when 
the original road has curvature.  This increases the problem size, which in turn hinders 
our ability to achieve optimal solutions to the IWD optimization model, and limits the 
number of replications our ANA simulation can carry out in affordable time. 
 
Figure 18.   Dystopia Converted into Nodes and Arcs 
 
Figure 19 displays the network for the underlying case with starting locations and 
targets for three attackers.  The starting locations are near the city limits.  The target for 
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each attacker has been designated based on proximity to the starting position.  In 
particular, two transportation hubs and one police station have been chosen for this case 
(see Table 11).  The total value of these targets is 200.  
 
 
Figure 19.   Cape Hazard with Attackers and Targets 
  
Name Value Start Node 
Name 
Target Name Target Description 
A1 100 603_1_1 NN1409_1458 Old Towne Train Stop 
A2 60 NN772_1371 371_1_1 Grey Hound Bus Terminal 
A3 40 638_1_11 346_1_2 Police Station (Marlboro Station) 
Table 11.   Dystopia Scenario Agent Table 
 
For this test case, and given the size of the road network, we assume a maximum 
of 50 transparent interdictions, 25 traps and 75 decoys, combined in different ways 
depending on the scenario.  
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2. Results 
Table 12 shows the summary of the results where estimated Vˆ and σˆ are 
calculated as in equations (12) and (13).  Like in the Basic Problem, the values for 
perceptive, naïve and clairvoyant behaviors are calculated exactly.  We employ 500N = , 
except for the communicative behavior which uses 3,500N = . 
We first caution the reader that the IWD solutions obtained for Scenario V and 
Scenario VII have not converged to their optimal values.  The optimality gap after eight 
hours of execution for these two scenarios is over 100%.  We use the solution for 
Scenario IV as a surrogate feasible solution for Scenario V.  Likewise, we use the 
solution for Scenario VI with Scenario VII.  
As with the Basic test case, the results conform with theoretical relationships 
listed in Section A.  Also, the communicative behavior improves the attackers’ 
performance for scenarios where traps are utilized (Scenarios IV through VII).  Also, as 
in that case, Scenario V yields the best or near-best strategy for the defender.  However, 
since we have used the optimal solution to Scenario IV as a substitute for Scenario V, we 
cannot ascertain the gain of using decoys as we did in the Basic test case. 
The Appendix contains graphical illustration of the of the interdiction plans.  
Table 12.   Result Summary for Dystopia Scenarios 
Clairvoyant
I 0 0 0 0.94 0.94 1.13 4.31 1.11 0.33 1.34 0.35 0.94
II 50 0 0 158.16 158.16 158.61 10.76 158.17 0.65 171.21 0.56 158.14
III 50 0 75 181.29 62.83 181.53 8.76 178.82 0.55 191.35 0.41 33.60
IV 50 25 0 196.01 196.01 181.39 7.36 193.92 0.34 198.74 0.17 158.25
V * 50 25 75 196.01 196.01 181.39 7.36 193.92 0.34 198.74 0.17 158.25
VI 0 25 0 160.27 160.27 109.50 8.81 159.30 0.25 160.38 0.13 1.71
VII * 0 25 75 160.27 160.27 109.50 8.81 159.30 0.25 160.38 0.13 1.71
Blue's Best 109.50 #### 160.38
Red's Best 181.53 #### #######
Scenario Description





* IWD Not Solved Optimally
Simulation Results




Vˆ σˆ Vˆ Vˆ σˆσˆV V V
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IV. GRAPHICAL USER INTERFACE 
A Graphical User Interface (GUI) application has been built which allows for the 
creation and execution of the network interdiction optimization and simulation models 
described in Chapter II.  This chapter provides an overview of the GUI and other tools 
built and/or used in conjunction with the GUI.  As an integrated application, the GUI is 
intended to become a user-friendly environment which aids with problem data 
preparation and validation, setting up and running the optimization and simulation 
models, and interpreting the results through visualization features, which include a 
graphical depiction of the problem network.  The reader and potential user of the GUI is 
cautioned that, at the time of this writing, the GUI is still in an early, prototypic stage.   
A. DESIGN 
1. Tables, Queries and Macros 
The GUI has been built in MS-Access [Microsoft®, 2003] and contains a set of 
queries, forms, and helper tables to aid the user in managing the problem data, that is, 
input, deletion, modification and general manipulation of all the sets and parameters 
delineated in Chapter II. The GUI also contains macros which allow the user launching 
the IWD optimization model and the ANA simulation model, and retrieve their results.  
Figure 20 lists the tables used by the GUI.  All of these tables are linked to two 
independent databases which contain specific tables for the IWD and ANA models.  In 
particular, tables with names ending in “(Xpress)” are linked to the IWD optimization 
model.  For example, table Arc(Xpress) contains exclusively the arc information used by 
the IWD model, namely the arc tail and head nodes, the interdictability character of the 
arc, and the values for nominal, transparent, trap and decoy probabilities of detection on 
the arc.  On the other hand, tables ArcList and ArcTypes contain specific ANA data, such 
as the arc index values for array referencing, and the arc type nominal multiplier values 
for nominal interdiction value calculations. 
 46
 
Figure 20.   GUI: Supporting Table List 
 
Figure 21 shows the list of queries built for the GUI.  These range from “output” 
(consult) queries, which export the data for the simulation, to “update” queries which 
calculate and modify the detection values for the individual arcs according to the methods 
described in Chapter II.  For example, output query ArcOut selects all the arcs that define 
the network, its individual interdiction values and the optimization solution and formats 
these data for exporting as text into a file called arclist.txt. The update query 
update_Interdiction_Type takes the solution from the Plan(Xpress) table and translates it 
into text values to place on the ArcList’s Interdiction_Type field.  This allows the ANA 
simulation to obtain the placements of the interdiction assets. 
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Figure 21.   GUI: Supporting Query List  
 
Figure 22 lists the “macros” contained in the interface.  Each macro consists of 
sets of instructions to perform.  For example, the Export Network macro updates all 
necessary array indices, and exports all of the text files required for the ANA simulation.  
Both queries and macros can be activated manually by selecting them from the 




Figure 22.   GUI: Supporting Macro List 
2. Forms 
Forms help display the data contained in the tables and queries. They contain 
buttons that execute queries or macros.  We next describe how the forms interact with the 
data tables and the queries.  The forms for our GUI are listed in Figure 23.   
 
Figure 23.   GUI: Supporting Form List 
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When a user opens the GUI the Switch Board Form (Figure 24) opens by default.  
The Switch Board Form is the so-called “main” form for the GUI.  Network editing 
functions, model parameters and simulation control functions are accessed via this form.  
We now describe all the features that can be accessed through buttons and other objects 
on the Switch Board Form. 
Switch Board: “File” multi-tab: 
File control is performed on the Switch Board Form via the “File” multi-tab 
object: The “Data Set” tab allows the user to load an existing problem or to save the 
incumbent one, whereas the “New Data Set” tab allows the user to create a brand new 
case from scratch or from the current one loaded.   
 
 
Figure 24.   Switchboard Form  
Switch Board: “Network” button: 
The “Network” button gives access to the “Forward Star” form (Figure 25).  This 
is a main editing form for the network data.  It allows control of all the data elements 
shown in the figure.   
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The top section of the “Forward Star” form allows for Node data elements to be 
controlled, while the bottom sub-form allows for editing the arc attributes.   
Editable data for a node are its name and long name, and X-Y location. Other 
attributes such as size and color are used for graphical visualization only.  Arc data 
includes its type (e.g., city street or highway), length, and detection probabilities based on 
the type of interdiction (if any) or otherwise nominal.     
This form also shows the IWD optimization model solution under the column 
labeled “interdiction_type,” which refers to the type of interdiction asset placed on the 
arc, if any.   
In order to transfer the data to the simulation module, certain queries need to be 
executed.  The “Export Network” button processes the data into the required format and 
exports all the necessary data files.   
The “Network Drawer” button displays the problem network graphically, as 
described below.  
Finally, the “Calculate Nominal Values” button executes the update_Nominal 
query, which in turn updates the nominal values based on the arc lengths. 
Remark: Although this form can be used to input a network from scratch, this 
capability is not intended to be used with large networks.  If the data is contained in 
another database or in a spreadsheet, a user can utilize the MS-Access import capabilities 
to feed the data to the GUI (as long as certain conditions are met, such as field name 
matching in both data storages).  The next section in this chapter addresses a method for 
generating a network which illustrates this. 
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Figure 25.   Forward Star Form for Network Data Input 
 
Switch Board: “Property Table” button: 
The “Property Table” form (Figure 26), allows for batch changes to the network 
nodes as well as X and Y transformation in order to aid the user obtain a better graphical 
display of the network.  For example, the user may modify the X-Y scale and/or skew 
factors in order to see more detail on a dense network.  In addition, the user may opt to 
display a subset of nodes, attackers, etc. 
Of course, the elements in this form do not alter the model parameters or its 
solutions.   
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Figure 26.   Property Table Form 
 
Switch Board: “Agent Manager” button: 
The “Agent Manager” button launches the “AgentList” form (Figure 27).  This 
form allows the user to enter the parameters for the attackers (called agents in the form), 




Figure 27.   Agent List Form 
 
Switch Board: “Send to Xpress” button: 
The IWD optimization model is currently implemented using Xpress-MP 
(therefore the name for this button, and associated form, as seen in Figure 28).  The 
Xpress-MP form allows the user to enter the number of transparent interdictions, traps 
and decoys for the problem.  In addition, an “index” is generated automatically as an 
identifier for the case (this field is required by the data tables associated with the 
optimization process to differentiate among several resource scenarios for the same 
network case).   
The “Obj. Value” field is populated with the optimal (or otherwise achieved) 
objective function value after the IWD optimization model is run.  That is, this field is the 
expected amount of target value interdicted assuming a perceptive behavior.  Before 
running the IDW optimization model to retrieve the objective value (along with the full 
interdiction plan), the network and agents data needs to be sent to the optimization 
module.  The “Export Data” button takes care of this function by translating the tables 
from the GUI’s database to the optimizer’s database.  Once this step is complete, the 
“Run Optimization” button can be executed.  This button will launch an MS-DOS batch 
file which runs the IWD optimization model in command line execution mode.  When the 
execution is complete, the “Update Results” button can be used to read those results and 
transfer them to the GUI’s database.  Finally, the “Export to Simulation” button transfers 
the data into text data files needed by the ANA simulation model. 
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Figure 28.   Xpress MP control form 
 
Switch Board: “Simulation” button: 
The ANA simulation can also be executed via the GUI.  Figure 29 shows the 
“Simulation” form which takes care of the parameters and execution of the ANA 
simulation.  The “Output File” field contains the file name where the simulation output 
will be redirected.  The “Number of Replications” field is used to establish the number of 
samples for each simulation.  The “Communication Period” parameter tells the ANA 
how long to extend the communication horizon during the communicative behavior 
simulation (please see Chapter II).  The “Extra Parameters” field is an optional text field 
that allows the user to enter any other parameters (e.g., in anticipation of potential minor 
modifications to the simulation module that require a few additional input parameters).  
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Figure 29.   Simulation Form 
 
Switch Board: “Network Drawer”button: 
The “Network Drawer” is a Java applet [Savitch, 2005] which uses the node and 
arc text data files exported by the GUI as input for drawing the network.   
If the networks to be drawn contain interdiction results in their data files, then the 
application will color the arcs by assigning blue to transparent interdictions, red to traps 
and yellow to decoys.  All other arcs are colored in light gray.  Also, agent starting 
positions nodes are colored red, and target nodes in black.  Figure 30 shows an example 
of a network drawer display.  The current version of the “Network Drawer” module does 
not depict agent routes.  
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Figure 30.   Network Drawer: Color Key 
 
B. SHAPE FILE TO ARC CONVERTER  
Real-world networks are usually created using Geographic Information System 
(GIS) tools, using shape file format [ESRI, 1998] or similar.  We have used a freeware 
converter tool called Shape Viewer 1.20 [Hammound, 1998], which allows us to convert 
“shapefile”-formatted files into Microsoft Excel and Access, so they can be utilized by 
our GUI with the help of some ad-hoc software code written in Java.  As an illustrative 
example, in this section we discuss the necessary steps to covert the original Dystopia 
shape file [Locke, 2008]. (which originated the Dystopia case analyzed in Chapter III), 
into the format required by the GUI. 
The first step consists of decoding the shape file into a set of line segment labels 
and coordinates.  This is accomplished with Shape Viewer.  Figure 31 shows the 
Dystopia road network file in Shape Viewer 1.20. 
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`   
Figure 31.   Visualization of Dystopia with Shape Viewer 1.20 
 
A special feature of Shape Viewer 1.20 is its capability to export the shapefile file 
into an Excel document.  The spreadsheet in Excel contains the basic structure necessary 
to reconstruct the shape file’s picture.  Table 13 shows a sample of the exported file in 
Excel.  The columns labeled “polyline,” “part” and “point id” uniquely identify the 
segment to which the point located at the associated X and Y coordinates belongs.  By 
understanding this construct, a transformation of the table can be made, which converts 
these data into a “basic” set of arcs and nodes.  The transformation is made in MS-
Access. Table 14 shows an example of this new construct for the same data sample as in 
Table 13. 
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Polyline Id Part Id Point Id X Y
1 1 1 0.0755 0.1412
1 1 2 0.0689 0.1440
1 1 3 0.0590 0.1432
1 1 4 0.0542 0.1434
1 1 5 0.0483 0.1452
1 1 6 0.0417 0.1487
1 1 7 0.0368 0.1530
1 1 8 0.0414 0.1558
1 1 9 0.0457 0.1561
2 1 1 0.2334 0.3198
2 1 2 0.2363 0.3158  
Table 13.   Excerpt Output of Shape Viewer 1.20 
 
Table 14.   Basic Node and Arc Construct 
 
An assumption at this point needs to be made regarding arc direction: We assume 
the allowed direction of flow is given by the order of the nodes defining the arc, from tail 
to head. The assumption allows us to arrange the complete list of nodes (3392 for 
Dystopia) in ascending order.  Then, we can break the polylines by assigning a “NULL” 
value to the last point prior to the next polyline start node.  This scheme allows us to 
build the set of nodes and arcs: The nodes simply consist of the “Node Name” and “X,Y” 
coordinates.  The arcs consist of all (Tail, Head) pairs which do not contain “NULL” as 
an assignment to Head. 
NodeName PartName PolyID Part Point X Y Tail Head
1-1-1 1-1 1 1 1 7.55E-02 0.14123 1-1-1 1-1-2
1-1-2 1-1 1 1 2 6.89E-02 0.14396 1-1-2 1-1-3
1-1-3 1-1 1 1 3 5.90E-02 0.14321 1-1-3 1-1-4
1-1-4 1-1 1 1 4 5.42E-02 0.14336 1-1-4 1-1-5
1-1-5 1-1 1 1 5 4.83E-02 0.14515 1-1-5 1-1-6
1-1-6 1-1 1 1 6 0.04172 0.14871 1-1-6 1-1-7
1-1-7 1-1 1 1 7 3.68E-02 0.15302 1-1-7 1-1-8
1-1-8 1-1 1 1 8 4.14E-02 0.15584 1-1-8 1-1-9
1-1-9 1-1 1 1 9 4.57E-02 0.15614 1-1-9 NULL
2-1-1 2-1 2 1 1 0.2334 0.31975 2-1-1 2-1-2
2-1-2 2-1 2 1 2 0.23629 0.31578 2-1-2 2-1-3
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If, at this point, we redrew the map from the GUI, it would look just like the 
original shape file.  However, the network would consist of no intersections, which are 
obviously necessary for network analysis.  Figure 32 shows a section of Dystopia at this 
step of the transformation. 
 
Figure 32.   Dystopia (transformed) with no intersects 
 
The calculation of the intersections requires specific code that finds the 
intersection point, creates the new nodes, determines the new arcs with proper directions, 
and inserts the arcs into the network.  The code was written in Java and assumes that all 
the arcs that “intersect” are real intersections.  In this sense, our Java code generates more 
intersections than exist in the actual network, for example, between highways and tertiary 
roads; and it does not take into account overpasses.  These, however, represent a small 
fraction of all possible intersections, and therefore could be adjusted manually, if 
necessary.  Figure 33 shows the same area portrayed in Figure 32, but with the 
intersections as found by the code marked in red. 
The shape file converter may, in fact, have applications to any analysis which 
requires a translation from a shape file into a Node-Arc construct. 
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Figure 33.   Final Transformation of Dystopia 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
A.  CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has initiated the testing of the IWD optimization model, which 
provides the distribution of transparent and deceptive interdiction assets in a network to 
defend against attacks carried out by VBIEDs.  We measure the effectiveness of the 
allocation in terms of the probability of interdicting the attacker and/or the expected value 
interdicted (e.g., based on the expected number of lives saved). 
In order to perform the testing of the IWD, the author has developed an agent-
based simulation model, called ANA, and a graphical user interface which integrates the 
IWD and ANA modules.   
The ANA module models multiple attacker behaviors which are run against the 
outputs of the IWD.  Since the IWD model is based on the assumption of a perceptive 
behavior and optimal routing by the attackers, the ANA explores other five behaviors: 
naïve, communicative, route blocker (static), route blocker (dynamic) and clairvoyant.  
These behaviors provide the defender with a more comprehensive set of measures to 
analyze the effectiveness of the IWD solution.  The naïve behavior is solely based on 
shortest distance to the target. All other behaviors are still perceptive-like, but incorporate 
features such as learning (communicative), and random detours (route blocker static and 
dynamic).  The clairvoyant behavior assumes full knowledge by the attacker and is used 
solely for bounding purposes.  
Seven scenarios with different combinations of interdiction assets have been used 
in each of the small and realistically-sized network cases tested.  Several outcomes of 
general application to any case have been derived, while other results are case-specific.  
We find most useful from a decision-making (attacker’s or defender’s) point of view the 
following insights:  
- As classical network theory establishes, in a fully transparent scenario the 
perceptive behavior is the best for the attacker.  Conversely, the only 
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reasonable defense against a clairvoyant attacker is to plan the allocation of all 
defenses as transparent. 
- However, if the network incorporates deception, any other behavior (than 
perceptive) may be advantageous to the attacker.  Which type of behavior is 
case-dependent.  This can be utilized by either side to change their own tactics 
based on the information they have about the opponent’s tactics.  For 
example, if the attacker knows the defender is using deception (obviously, 
without identifying the specifics), a naïve route may be the best in some cases.  
Conversely, if the defender infers that the attacker is using a naïve behavior, 
he may decide to go back to a nearly transparent mode.   
- A communicative behavior proves particularly effective over time for the 
attackers against scenarios containing traps.  For the defender, this means it 
would be prudent to determine how much time to leave a deception plan in 
place before it loses efficiency.  This thesis has illustrated how the tools 
developed can assist in determining this time frame.   
- Decoys are most effective if used in defense against perceptive-like behaviors.  
They are rendered ineffective against attackers which behave naïvely.  This is 
specifically noteworthy in scenarios where the only interdiction methods 
being utilized are deceptive (traps and decoys). 
- Finally, if the defender expects the attacker to behave with any perceptive-like 
behavior, then the addition of transparent assets to traps and decoys may be of 
little value.  This result, while case-dependent, could be significant to the 
defender since there is potential for cost savings via substitution of personnel 
at roadblocks by force-multiplier deceptive technologies. 
B. FUTURE WORK 
While working on this thesis, several concepts have arisen that warrant further 
research.  These relate to five areas:  
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(a) The IWD optimization model:  
- The optimization model goal is to provide the defender with the best 
allocation of the interdiction assets that maximizes expected interdicted value 
(assuming a perceptive behavior).  As stated in this thesis, the current IWD model 
accomplishes this only for the single-attacker case (with one or several targets).  
For a multiple-attacker case, the necessary simplifications for better tractability 
make the solution potentially suboptimal to the original problem.  Future research 
may seek alternative methods to solve the original problem.   
- The existing IWD model is a large-scale mixed-integer program, and 
becomes difficult to solve by commercial software in realistically-sized networks.  
Further research may develop new algorithms (probably based on decomposition) 
to overcome this difficulty.  
(b) The ANA simulation model:  Behaviors lend themselves to author’s 
interpretation and assumptions.  Developing more behaviors and creating mixed-
ones (e.g., a naïve-communicative, or “weighed” behaviors) can add realism and 
cultural customization to the attackers.   
(c) The interaction between IWD and ANA models:  Since the IWD model 
assumes a perceptive behavior, feedback from the ANA simulation might guide 
subsequent optimizations.  Feedback may consist, for example, on the simulated 
routes for the attackers, which can be incorporated into a modified version of 
IWD to produce alternative interdiction plans.  For example, the modified IWD 
could assign more “weight” to arcs identified by the simulation. 
(d) Testing:   
- Further testing is necessary, including sensitivity analysis on the amount 
of assets of all types.  This may, for example, help answer the question about 
minimal combinations of assets necessary to obtain a pre-specified interdiction 
value required for mission success.   
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- Testing on a real set of city networks, and using accurate values for the 
interdiction probabilities (nominal and for each interdiction asset type) would add 
realism to the results.  However, even in the absence of a real data set, sensitivity 
analysis over those values may still provide useful insights.  For example, it might 
be determined that a certain allocation of traps and decoys remains optimal if the 
interdiction probabilities of traps and the perceptive probabilities of decoys lie 
within certain ranges. 
- A robust design of experiments analysis can be developed with the goal 
of finding defensive strategies that hold up against a variety of attack behaviors.  
“Robustness” here entails measuring deviations from each behavior outcome with 
respect to an ideal (or desired) interdiction value.  
(e) Graphical user interface:  Improving the GUI for ease of use will mature the 
tool to a state where it can be delivered to on-scene commanders.  For example, a 
mouse driven editor and selector in the Network Drawer application can help with 
network generation and manipulation. 
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APPENDIX: DYSTOPIA GRAPHICS 
 This Appendix provides a graphical representation of the IWD solution for the 
Dystopia test case.  Red color indicates placement of traps, yellow is used for decoys and 
blue represents transparent interdictions.  
 
Figure 34.    




Figure 36.   Dystopia Scenario III, Transparent Interdiction and Decoys 
 




Figure 38.   Dystopia Scenario VI & VII, Traps only 
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